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I. INTRODUCTION
HE environmental issues in this year's Survey period continued to
vary and raised concerns that are becoming of increasing impor-
tance in the environmental legal area. One case involved the issue
of financial disclosure and accounting for environmental risks, costs, and
liabilities. In another case, the effect of international law and agreements
on environmental laws in the United States were the basis of the court's
analysis. As events evolve over the next few years in the arena of climate
change, environmental financial disclosure and the importance of interna-
tional treaty negotiations will only become more important in the United
States, and even more so in Texas as it is the largest emitter of green-
house gases in the country.
The remaining cases raised issues relating to environmental cleanup
costs, air emissions, wastewater discharges, and the usual panoply of envi-
ronmental concerns and claims. These cases present legal precedent im-
portant to all lawyers in Texas who practice in the continuously evolving
area of environmental law.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether a
corporate officer is guilty of civil securities fraud and insider trading when
[Vol. 621120
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environmental reserves were altered in a manner that resulted in a
change in the corporate earnings.1 The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filed a civil case against Bruce Snyder, the former
Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer of Waste Management, Inc.
(WMI). The SEC alleged that Snyder signed and filed a misleading 10-Q
in 1999. The SEC alleged that the 10-Q was materially false and mislead-
ing because it overstated income and included "nonrecurring" adjust-
ments without appropriate disclosure. The SEC also alleged that Snyder
engaged in insider trading because he sold 5,500 shares of WMI stock
four days after the 10-Q in question was filed.
The acts that the SEC alleged resulted in a materially false and mis-
leading 10-Q were that changes for certain landfill reserves were reduced,
which added $12 million to first quarter earnings; reserves for certain clo-
sure and post-closure costs for landfills were reduced, which added $24
million to first quarter earnings; reserves for a deep well were reduced,
which added $12 million to first quarter earnings; and that international
environmental reserves were reduced, which added $25 million to first
quarter earnings. The SEC argued that these events occurred at a time
when the management was concerned that the earnings of WMI would
not meet expectations for that quarter.2
Snyder argued various defenses including that the advice of Arthur
Andersen, the accounting firm working for and auditing WMI at the time,
and the advice of counsel showed that he did not have the scienter neces-
sary to engage in filing of a false and misleading 10-Q. The jury issued a
verdict against him.
At the appellate level, the Fifth Circuit found that the jury instruction
relating to the accounting firm's opinion appeared to shift the burden of
proof to the defendant Snyder. 3 Thus, the court reversed and remanded
the case to the district court for a new trial.
The case will have to be retried, unless the parties settle the case. What
is instructive here is the SEC's considered analysis of the way in which
environmental reserves are changed and the timing of such changes.
Care should be taken by corporate officers and other employees as they
alter environmental reserves, and as a result, alter the earnings for the
year or a quarter. The SEC has shown, in a prior case involving Ashland,
Inc., a similar aggressive approach to parties involved in significant reduc-
tions in environmental reserves. 4
1. U.S. SEC v. Snyder, 292 F. App'x 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 394-99.
3. Id. at 407.
4. Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1984, Making Findings and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order, Exchange Act
Release No. 54830 (Nov. 29, 2006).
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III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES
A. AFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON APPLICATION OF
US ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
In United States v. Jho,5 the Fifth Circuit considered how the interpre-
tation of a federal statute is affected by principles of international law.
The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) requires maintenance of
an oil record book which includes, inter alia, a log of discharges from the
ship and disposal of oil-water mixtures. Kun Yun Jho served as the chief
engineer on a foreign-flagged ship that transferred bulk petroleum from
off-shore oil tankers to ports in the Gulf of Mexico. Coast Guard inspec-
tions revealed evidence of tampering with pollution control and monitor-
ing equipment for water discharges from the ship. The government
charged Jho with eight criminal counts for knowingly failing to maintain
an oil record book, corresponding to eight dates the ship entered a port in
the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding
that prosecution violated principles of international law, and the govern-
ment appealed.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court's interpretation of the crimi-
nal statute de novo. On appeal, the defendant argued that the require-
ment to maintain an oil record book only imposed a duty to make entries
in the book. 6 The defendants further argued that because the entries
were made outside U.S. ports and navigable waters, no violation of APPS
occurred.
The Fifth Circuit, however, read the maintenance requirement to in-
clude a duty for foreign-flagged ships to keep the oil record book "accu-
rate (or at least not knowingly inaccurate) upon entering" U.S. ports. 7
Under international law, nations have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce
laws within their borders unless they consent to surrender their jurisdic-
tion.8 The APPS showed that the United States decided to exercise its
jurisdiction, not waive it.9 Further, the law of the flag doctrine did not
limit the general rule. 10 Under the law of the flag doctrine, a merchant
ship is part of the territory of the country whose flag the ship flies, and
actions on the ship are subject to the laws of that country." The court
noted that the doctrine "does not mandate that anything that occurs on
the ship must be handled by the flag state."' 2 Because the court found
that the United States had jurisdiction to enforce the APPS on acts com-
mitted in U.S. ports, and because Jho failed to maintain the oil record
book in a U.S. port, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal
5. 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008).
6. Id. at 403.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 405.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 406.
11. Id. at 406-07.
12. Id. at 406.
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of the oil record book charges against Jho.13
IV. TORT AND CONTRACT CLAIMS
A. NUISANCE CLAIMS FOR AESTHETICS
As wind projects continue to be constructed in Texas for their tax in-
centives and other incentives that encourage the development of renewa-
ble energy, some who live by the newly erected wind towers and turbines
do not find them attractive. These residents object to the loss of the view
that existed prior to the tall white structures springing up in their vicinity.
In a case decided during the Survey period, neighboring landowners filed
suit against wind farm operators, asserting claims for private and public
nuisance and seeking injunctive relief.14 The district court granted the
wind farm operators' motion for partial summary judgment and, follow-
ing trial, entered a take-nothing judgment against the neighbors and
taxed each party with its own costs. 15
The judge's instructions to the jury on the issue of whether a nuisance
existed is of particular interest. The court's instructions stated that:
you may not consider whether the Plaintiffs are offended, disturbed,
or annoyed because of the way the wind turbine project has affected
their landscape, scenery, or the beauty of the area. Under the laws
of the State of Texas, a condition that causes aesthetic changes to the
view, scenery, landscape, or beauty of an area is not a nuisance. 16
In reviewing this jury instruction and the rulings of the lower court, the
Eastland Court of Appeals considered the definition of nuisance under
Texas law. "Texas law defines 'nuisance' as 'a condition that substantially
interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable
discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities.' '"17 The
court relied on prior appellate court decisions that concluded the con-
struction of a lumber yard, apartment garage, or cemetery did not consti-
tute a nuisance. 18
While the plaintiffs conceded that this case law did not permit them to
file suit merely because they subjectively did not like the view of the
windmills, they argued, among other things, that a reasonable person
standard should be applied to combine the light flickering at night from
the wind towers, the shadow flicker at dusk and dawn, and the noise.' 9
However, the appellate court concluded that "Texas law does not provide
a nuisance action for aesthetical impact" and upheld the trial court's
13. Id. at 409-10.
14. Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet.
denied).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 508 n.3.
17. Id. at 509 (citing Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 269 (Tex.
2004)).
18. Id. at 509-10.




B. STANDING TO BRING PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIMS
UNDER TORT THEORIES
In another nuisance case, the plaintiffs sued alleging the continuous
release of chemicals since 1905 from a wood treatment plant owned and
operated by the defendants. 21 Plaintiffs filed a class action suit in state
court alleging substantively identical facts in June 2005. In October 2006,
the state court ruled that the claims must be brought individually. In-
stead of pursuing individual claims in that suit, the plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their claims.
The court found the claims to allege a permanent nuisance because
plaintiffs alleged regular contamination of their properties from the
plant.22 The court further found that the nuisance began in 1905 when
the plant commenced its allegedly contaminating operation.23 The court
noted that the right to bring an action for nuisance-based injury to prop-
erty belongs to the person who owns the property at the time of injury.24
The right to pursue the claim does not pass to subsequent property own-
ers unless expressly assigned. 25 The earliest date that any of the plaintiffs
was alleged to have an interest in a property near the plant was 1912. The
court found that the plaintiffs made only conclusory allegations that they
were assigned the rights and failed to provide any documents in support
of their contention, despite the fact that the documents would be in their
control.26 Accordingly, the court held, as a matter of law, that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to bring the claims. 27
In another environmental tort suit, plaintiffs alleged nuisance, negli-
gence, gross negligence, and stigma damages based on contamination of
groundwater by trichloroethylene (TCE) from defendants' aluminum ex-
trusion facility.2 8 Plaintiffs claimed that they offered more than a scintilla
of evidence for their nuisance allegation, showing that their properties
were contaminated by TCE. Although the affidavit of the plaintiffs' ex-
pert included a map allegedly showing a TCE plume and that plaintiffs
lived in the footprint of the plume, the court concluded that no evidence
was presented showing that any of the plaintiffs had any interests in the
properties shown on the map.29 Accordingly, the court decided that
20. Id. at 513.
21. Brinston v. Koppers Indus., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972-73 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
22. Id. at 978.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 977 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002,
pet. denied)).
25. Id. (citing Ceramic Tile Int'l, Inc. v. Balusek, 137 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2004, no pet.)).
26. Id. at 979.
27. Id. at 981.
28. Adamcek v. Reynolds Metals Co., No. 13-06-240-CV, 2008 WL 1822772, at *1
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Apr. 24, 2008, pet. denied).
29. Id. at *3.
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plaintiffs had failed to provide any evidence showing an invasion of plain-
tiffs' interests30 or raise an issue regarding the element of proximate
causation. 31
Finally, the court considered plaintiffs' contention that the trial court
improperly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on stigma
damages. The court found that plaintiffs, despite an additional request
for briefing on the issue, failed to provide a clear and concise argument
with citation to authorities and the record.32 The court, therefore, held
that plaintiffs waived their argument on this point. 33
C. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACT CLAIMS IN AN
OIL AND GAS TRANSACTION
Environmental remediation issues are generally addressed in contracts
to purchase and sell oil and gas wells, leases, and properties. These issues
are often addressed through the so-called "environmental defect" pro-
cess. As these provisions are largely drafted by oil and gas lawyers, they
follow "title defect" provisions. In doing so, the provisions do not always
address the environmental issues in as sound a manner as they could.
Environmental remediation provisions in other purchase and sale agree-
ments, such as asset sales and corporate mergers and acquisitions, might
play a role in enhancing these provisions in oil and gas agreements.
In the relevant suit during the Survey period,34 the purchaser asserted
breach of contract claims and sought approximately $150,000 in damages
for an allegedly improperly completed saltwater disposal well installed
under a Texas Railroad Commission permit. In response, the seller de-
nied purchaser's claims and filed a counterclaim to recover $16,710 as
reimbursement for amounts spent on pre-closing cleanup work on the
property sold.35 In reviewing the case, the trial court granted summary
judgment to the sellers with respect to the injection well but did not state
its reasons in the opinion.36
The main issue before the court was whether the sellers could obtain a
post-closing purchase price adjustment for the expense of environmental
remediation work conducted prior to closing. There was an allegation
that there had been an oral agreement that the sellers would conduct this
remediation at their expense, but the court focused on the contractual
language to address the summary judgment before it.
The agreement was structured to allow the purchaser to inspect the oil
and gas property or properties prior to closing and to submit a list of
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *4.
33. Id.
34. Chaparral Tex., L.P. v. W. Dale Morris, Inc., No. H-06-2468, 2008 WL 4093704
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2008).




"Environmental Defects" prior to closing. The agreement defined "Envi-
ronmental Defect." The definition is important:
any material environmental defect relating to the Interests in the na-
ture of environmental pollution or contamination, including pollu-
tion of the soil, ground water or the air; underground injection
activities and waste disposal on site or offsite; failure to comply with
applicable land use, surface disturbance, licensing or notification re-
quirements; or violations of environmental or land use rules, regula-
tions, demands or orders of appropriate state or federal regulatory
agencies. 37
The importance of this provision, according to the court, was that it
included those claims that did not necessarily constitute a violation of
environmental laws, such as pollution or contamination. The court fo-
cused, however, on the provision of the agreement that stated that "no
Purchase Price adjustments . . . for Environmental Defects" and con-
cluded that this provision barred any claims related to "Environmental
Defects," whether a decline in property value or remediation costs
resulted.3 8
This process was developed by oil and gas lawyers who had experience
with title issues and "Title Defects," but perhaps not much experience
with environmental laws or environmental remediation issues. This ap-
proach functions to press all issues to closing, but it may leave the pur-
chaser with underground contamination issues that may not be tested
prior to closing. In fact, in a case that involved post-closing analysis, in
which we were engaged, millions of dollars in liabilities were discovered
after closing on a large oil and gas transaction. Where significant investi-
gation or Phase II Environmental Assessment Work is not practical or
desirable prior to closing, the environmental defect process may not be
the best way to address environmental liability issues in oil and gas trans-
actions. In other types of transactions, indemnities are provided by the
seller and, at times, amounts, years of duration, and other limitations are
placed upon the ability to make claims under these provisions.
Another issue that arises in environmental defect provisions is the issue
of what constitutes a defect. Questions arise if contamination is in and of
itself a "violation" of environmental laws or if is it something that simply
imposes a remedial duty. The timing of the release may affect this analy-
sis, or at least raise issues for arguments by buyers and sellers in disputes.
Thus, the definition of "Environmental Defect" may prove very
important.
Environmental liabilities can arise from conditions underground, such
as soil or groundwater, and not be readily discoverable without drilling,
unlike title defects which may be more easily discovered with a review of
county deed records and other sources of information. Therefore, the title
37. Id. at *3.
38. Id. at *7.
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defect process may not be the best approach to address environmental
liability issues in contracts.
V. CLEAN WATER ACT
A. WATER CODE PROVISION APPLIES OVER ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT FOR FILING SUIT CHALLENGING
PERMITTING DECISION
Concerns over the issuance of wastewater discharge permits are fre-
quently raised in the application or renewal for a permit. In a case de-
cided during the Survey period, an individual, Walter West, and the Sierra
Club filed a challenge to wastewater discharge permit.39 The trial court
and the Austin Court of Appeals both held that the request for judicial
review was untimely and that the court was, therefore, without
jurisdiction. 40
The Texas Water Code allows a person to seek judicial review of a
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) decision by filing
a petition for judicial review within thirty days after the effective date of
the decision.41 The appellate court noted that "administrative agencies
have discretion to set effective dates for their decisions and orders," and
that since "it was not otherwise stated in the permit, the Abitibi permit
was effective the day it was signed by the executive director. ' 42 The ap-
pellants argued that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) contained
an independent right to judicial review. The court interpreted precedent
to find that the APA provides an independent right to judicial review
only when the agency's enabling act is silent but the Water Code is not
silent.4 3 Because the Water Code expressly provided a right to judicial
review, the APA provision did not apply.44
Appellants further argued that the APA applied because the applica-
tion was a contested case. 45 The court held that approval of the applica-
tion was not a final decision in a contested case. Only one hearing
request had been granted, and neither West nor the Sierra Club were
parties. Additionally, once the hearing request was withdrawn, the appli-
cation no longer satisfied the APA definition of a contested case. The
court rejected the appellants' argument that once a matter is referred for
a hearing it retains the status of a contested case.4 6 Since the Water
Code, and not the APA applied, failure to challenge the approval within
the Water Code's thirty-day deadline deprived the court of jurisdiction. 47
39. Walter West, P.E. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 260 S.W.3d 256, 258 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied).
40. Id.
41. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.351 (Vernon 2008).
42. Walter, 260 S.W.3d at 260.
43. Id. at 261.
44. Id. at 260-61.
45. Id.




B. EFFECT OF CONSENT DECREE ON ABILITY TO FILE CITIZEN SUIT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had the op-
portunity to review the effect of a consent decree on a prior filed citizen
suit in Environmental Conservation Organization v. City of Dallas.48 In
December 2003, Environmental Conservation Organization (ECO) filed
a citizen suit against the City of Dallas (the City) alleging violations of the
Clean Water Act (CWA). Prior to the suit, the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated an investigation and enforce-
ment that ultimately resulted in a consent decree, filed in May 2006,
between the City and the EPA.49 After entry of the consent decree, the
City moved for summary judgment in the case with ECO, arguing that
resolution of the EPA enforcement action precluded a citizen suit based
on the same conduct.50 The district court dismissed ECO's suit on res
judicata grounds and ECO appealed. 51
As a threshold matter, the Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the
lower court had jurisdiction at the time it granted the City's summary
judgment motion, specifically whether the case was moot. 52 The court
noted because mootness is an element of standing, which is constitution-
ally required to maintain a suit, that a citizen suit may be dismissed as
moot even if the mootness arises out of developments after initiation of
the suit.53
With respect to mootness based on conduct of the defendant, the court
distinguished between cases involving voluntary conduct and cases in-
volving compelled conduct.54 If a defendant voluntarily stops offending
behavior, the defendant must show that the behavior could not reasona-
bly be expected to recur for the case to be dismissed as moot.55 On the
other hand, if administrative enforcement has compelled a defendant to
cease offending behavior, the case will be moot unless a realistic prospect
exists that the violations will continue despite the enforcement. 56 The
court reasoned that applying the "voluntary cessation" standard would
effectively cede primary CWA enforcement to citizens and would dis-
courage defendants from entering into a consent decree with federal or
state agencies because defendants would be exposed to penalties in both
enforcement and in the citizen suit.57 The "realistic prospect" standard,
on the other hand, is consistent with statutory preemption of citizen suits
by diligent prosecution; if a plaintiff shows "a realistic prospect" that vio-
lations will continue notwithstanding enforcement (e.g., a consent decree)
48. 529 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2008).
49. Id. at 523.
50. Id. at 524.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 526.
54. Id. at 527-29.
55. Id. at 527.




by the government, the plaintiff can likely show "a less-than-diligent
prosecution. '58 Because the consent decree is compulsory on the City of
Dallas, the court applied the "realistic prospect" standard.
The Fifth Circuit found that ECO could not show a realistic prospect
that the alleged violations "would continue notwithstanding the consent
decree," mooting ECO's claims for both injunctive relief and civil penal-
ties. 59 The court agreed with the lower court's determination that the
consent decree resolved each allegation in ECO's citizen suit.60 The
court refused to infer that the City would continue to violate the CWA
simply because the City had done so in the past.61 Underlying the Fifth
Circuit's decision was the recognition that ECO's interest in the citizen
suit was the public's interest, and that once EPA "secured a consent de-
cree that adequately addressed the same violations alleged" by ECO, the
public's interest had been vindicated. 62
In the same case, the lower court considered motions from both ECO
and the City of Dallas for recovery of attorney's fees incurred at the trial
court level.63 ECO sought their fees as a prevailing party under the
CWA, or alternatively, under a "catalyst theory." The court held that
ECO "was not a prevailing party because ECO did not obtain any actual
relief."'64 The court reasoned that ECO's suit was dismissed by the court
and so ECO was not a party to the litigation resolved by the consent
decree and, therefore, did not obtain any enforceable rights under the
decree.65 Turning to the catalyst theory, the court noted that under this
theory a plaintiff is considered a prevailing party if the lawsuit brings
about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct that achieves the
desired result.66 The court pointed out, however, that the United States
Supreme Court rejected the theory in a case involving a voluntary change
in activity by a defendant, reasoning that the a voluntary action did not
have "the necessary judicial imprimatur ... to establish prevailing party
status. ' 67 Further, the court reasoned that even if the catalyst theory was
available in this case, ECO was not entitled to fees because "no evidence
demonstrated" that the ECO citizen suit "had any impact on the ultimate
resolution of the EPA litigation."'68
Regarding the City's request for fees under the Clean Water Act, the
Court declined to award fees, finding that the case was not "frivolous,
58. Id. at 528-29.
59. Id. at 529.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 531.
63. Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, No. 3-03-CV-2951-BD, 2007 WL
4165917, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2007).
64. Id. at *2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health &




unreasonable, or without foundation. '69 The court reasoned that the civil
penalties and injunctive relief obtained by the EPA against the City of
Dallas showed that the ECO suit had considerable merit.70
VI. SOLID WASTE
A. COST RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 107 OF CERCLA
The federal courts in Texas issued a number of opinions on cost recov-
ery under both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 71 and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal
Act (TSWDA).72 Among them is the latest in the series of decisions, 73
Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, LLC.7 4 The pertinent facts are
that Aviall purchased a number of tracts from Cooper, discovered con-
tamination, and voluntarily investigated and remediated the properties
under programs administered by the TCEQ. Aviall brought suit against
Cooper for costs already incurred and anticipated future costs. In its lat-
est pleading, Aviall's suit rested on, inter alia, theories of CERCLA sec-
tion 107 cost recovery (and alternatively contribution under section 107)
and various state law grounds. Both Cooper and Aviall moved for sum-
mary judgment.75
Cooper asserted that Aviall's section 107 action must be dismissed
under section 113(1)76 because Aviall failed to notify the EPA Adminis-
trator and the U.S. Attorney General about the suit until well after it was
filed.77 The court noted, however, that unlike many citizen suit provi-
sions in environmental statutes, section 113(l) does not provide a dead-
line for providing a copy of the suit or establish any precondition for
filing a suit.78 The court further reasoned that many citizen suits are
brought to enforce public regulations typically enforced by the govern-
ment, while Aviall brought a private action for cost recovery. 79 The court
offered many possible rationales for section 113(1)80 and found that dis-
missing Aviall's claim would be inconsistent with CERCLA's goal of en-
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006); see, e.g., Vine St., LLC v. Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728, 757
(E.D. Tex. 2006); AMOCO Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
72. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.001 (Vernon 2001); see, e.g., Vine St.,
460 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
73. See generally, Scott D. Deatherage et al., Environmental Law, 60 SMU L. REV.
987, 996-97 (2007).
74. 572 F. Supp. 2d 676 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
75. Id. at 683.
76. "Whenever any action is brought under this chapter ... the plaintiff shall provide a
copy of the complaint to the Attorney General of the United States and to the Administra-
tor of the [EPA]." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(l) (2006).
77. Aviall, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
78. Id. at 686-87.
79. Id. at 687.
80. Id. Among them are that notice of the suit could allow EPA and the Attorney
General to monitor and assess the progress of § 107 actions, or would provide EPA with
information to provide to Congress about CERCLA's implementation. Id.
1130 [Vol. 62
Environmental Law
couraging voluntary cleanups. 81 The court accordingly denied Cooper's
motion on this ground. 82
Cooper also sought summary judgment on the basis that Aviall's re-
sponse costs were inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP).83 Among the requirements of the NCP is "public participation,"
which the court construed to have two requirements: "(1) there must be
sufficient oversight-either by the public or by a government agency
charged with protecting the public environmental interest . . . and (2)
parties who might foreseeably be affected by the private party's decisions
must be given a meaningful opportunity to participate in them. '84 In the
present case, because the investigation and cleanup was performed with
TCEQ oversight, the court held that Aviall "achieved the oversight inter-
est contemplated by the public participation requirement. '85
Regarding the opportunity for potentially responsible parties (PRPS)
to participate, the court analyzed Aviall's cleanup of each of the various
properties separately. With respect to one of the properties, the Forest
Park property, Aviall contacted and consulted with owners of two down-
gradient properties affected by contamination. Aviall also notified
Cooper of their intention to seek cost recovery. The court pointed out,
however, that Aviall never contacted or consulted other PRPs, adjoining
property owners, or the City of Dallas (which owned property affected by
releases at the property). 86 Although not an element of section 107 liabil-
ity, a plaintiff must show consistency with the NCP to recover costs or
damages under this provision. 87 The court held, therefore, that because
Aviall failed to allow all parties that might foreseeably be affected to par-
ticipate in the response at Forest Park, Aviall failed to comply with the
NCP and could not recover its costs. 88
With respect to another property, Love Field, the court found that Avi-
all produced enough evidence to avoid summary judgment with respect
to the public participation requirement of the NCP.89 After discovering
contamination at Love Field, Aviall notified Cooper, notified owners of
sixteen down-gradient properties potentially affected, published newspa-
per notices of its response actions, made its investigatory reports availa-
ble for public review, distributed local neighborhood newsletters about
the response, implemented a community relations plan, and held a public
meeting to discuss the proposed remedial plan. With these facts, the
court declined to find that Aviall, as a matter of law, failed to afford a
meaningful opportunity for comment.90
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 689.
84. Id. at 693.
85. Id. at 694.
86. Id. at 696.
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id. at 697-98.




B. USEFUL PRODUCT EXEMPTION
In Texas Tin Settling Defendants v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., a num-
ber of PRPs formed a group that paid for response and remediation costs
and then filed suit seeking cost recovery and contribution from other
PRPs, including Bayer USA, Inc.91 Bayer sold spent nickel catalyst to
the owner of the Tex Tin metal smelting facility. Bayer filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable under CERCLA, in
part because Bayer sold a useful product and, therefore, is not liable as an
arranger. 92
The plaintiffs alleged that Bayer was liable under CERCLA as an "ar-
ranger" for disposal of waste. Bayer argued that it sold a useful product,
namely nickel. Although Bayer was paid for the spent nickel catalyst,
plaintiffs argued that the transaction was a sham sale.93 The court
pointed out that Bayer used nickel catalyst in manufacturing two other
products and did not sell spent nickel catalyst as part of its business. 94
Only 14% of the material provided by Bayer was recovered as nickel.
Further, Bayer sold the spent nickel catalyst at 16.8% of the market value
of nickel recovered. The court determined that a reasonable fact finder
could conclude that although styled as a sale, Bayer arranged for treat-
ment or disposal of a hazardous substance (nickel). 95 Thus the court held
that Bayer was not entitled to summary judgment. 96
C. OWNER AND OPERATOR LIABILITY
Both state and federal cost recovery claims were considered in Ce-
lanese Corp. v. Coastal Water Authority.97 In this case, plaintiff Celanese
incurred costs responding to a methanol leak from a pipeline installed in
1971.98 In the late 1970s, Coastal Water Authority (CWA) contracted
with Kellog, Brown, & Root, Inc., (KBR) to design and supervise installa-
tion of a water pipeline that ran below and parallel to the Celanese meth-
anol line. Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc. (Eby) was the
excavation contractor. Cleanese alleged that the pipeline was damaged
by a backhoe operated by Eby, which led to the methanol leak. Celanese
also alleged that CWA, KBR, and Eby knew about the damage but hid it
without informing Celanese. Celanese brought a Texas Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act (TSWDA) cost recovery claim against CWA and brought
TSWDA and CERCLA cost recovery claims against KBR and Eby. 99
CWA sought summary judgment claiming it was not a person responsi-
91. G-96-2047, G-96-0272, 2008 WL 4376363, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008).
92. Id.









ble for solid waste under the TSWDA.100 Celanese argued that CWA
qualified as either an operator or arranger. Interpreting Texas law, the
Southern District made an Erie guess that Texas courts would look to
federal CERCLA cases in interpreting "operator," just as the Texas Su-
preme Court had done in interpreting "arranger."' 01 The court noted
that CWA's line did not leak and CWA did not have an active role in
operating the Celanese methanol pipeline.102 Celanese argued that CWA
was the operator of the project that damaged the methanol line, but the
court held that "the operator of a project is not equivalent to the operator
of a facility for purposes of [T]SWDA liability. °10 3 Possible negligence by
CWA's contractors did not transform CWA into an operator.10 4
CWA also argued that it was not an arranger because it did not take
any affirmative or intentional action to cause the leak. The court stated
that if CWA knew of and concealed damage to the pipeline, then CWA
arguably took affirmative and intentional action. 105 The court, however,
found that "Celanese [had] no more than a scintilla of evidence that
CWA knew of damage to the methanol line and did not inform Ce-
lanese. '' 10 6 Accordingly, the court held that CWA was not an arranger.10 7
With respect to Celanese's claims against KBR and Eby, the court con-
sidered a number of summary judgment grounds asserted by KBR and
Eby. For example, Eby asserted that Celanese did not have an approved
remediation plan and, thus, could not meet the first element of a TSWDA
cost recovery claim.10 8 At the time the suit was filed and when the court
conducted the summary judgment hearing, the TCEQ had not approved
Celanese's Response Action Plan (RAP). Prior to the court's ruling,
however, the TCEQ did approve the RAP and the court concluded that
the issue was moot.10 9
KBR and Eby sought summary judgment on the basis that neither
qualified as arrangers under CERCLA or the TSWDA.110 The court
noted that the Fifth Circuit requires the term arranger be given liberal
interpretation, and analyzed on a case-by-case basis, considering the to-
tality of the circumstances.' The court also pointed out that the Fifth
Circuit held that summary judgment was inappropriate in a case in which
factual disputes existed regarding the actual cause of contamination.1 1 2
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *4.




109. Id. Unfortunately (but understandably since it was not faced with the question),
the court did not address whether anything short of RAP approval is sufficient for a
TSWDA cost recovery claim.
110. Id. at *7.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *7-8.
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In the present case, the court concluded that "if the fact-finder accepts
Celenese's version of events, then KBR and Eby may be held liable as
arrangers."' 113 The court accordingly denied KBR's and Eby's motions
for summary judgment. 114
D. ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE TSWDA
Availability of attorney's fees was the issue in First Edwards, L.P. v.
Union Pacific Railway Co.115 First Edwards brought a cost recovery suit
under the TSWDA and a declaratory judgment under the Texas Declara-
tory Judgment Act. 1 6 First Edwards also sought attorney's fees pursuant
to the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act. Union Pacific removed the case
to federal court based on diversity and sought dismissal of the claims for
attorney's fees.117
The court noted that "federal courts sitting in diversity apply state sub-
stantive law and federal procedural law. 11 8 Further, Fifth Circuit prece-
dent supports the position that the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act is
not substantive law. 119 A party cannot, therefore, rely on the Texas De-
claratory Judgment Act to obtain attorney's fees in a diversity case.120
Accordingly, the court granted Union Pacific's motion to dismiss the
claim for attorney's fees. 121
E. DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE WITHOUT A PERMIT
In one case, the court addressed 22 a straightforward application of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's (RCRA) prohibition on dis-
posal of hazardous waste without a permit. 23 The opinion is an order
adopting findings of fact in a criminal action, as a basis for a plea bargain.
The defendants were alleged to have disposed of thirty-three compressed
gas cylinders filled with high pressure chlorine gas, a characteristic haz-
ardous waste, by digging a hole with a backhoe, tossing the cylinders in
from the bed of a truck, and then backfilling the hole. Defendants did
not have a RCRA permit for this disposal at their residential and ranch-
ing property.
113. Id. at *8.
114. Id.
115. No. H-08-1573, 2008 WL 2674859, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2008).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *2.
122. United States v. Hester, No. 1:08-CR-67(2), 2008 WL 4146368 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29,
2008); see also United States v. Hester, No. 1:08-CR-67(3), 2008 WL 3914410 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 25, 2008).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (2006).
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F. VENUE CRITICAL FOR CHALLENGING STATE AGENCY ACTION TO
PERFORM REMEDIATION ON PROPERTY
When a state agency seeks access to property to conduct remediation,
the question arises of how to challenge access to property necessary to
conduct such action. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Hale,124 the
proper jurisdiction for challenging an oil and gas conservation order to
enter property to conduct remediation was the critical issue. The Rail-
road Commission of Texas (Railroad Commission) proposed an environ-
mental remediation project on a ranch neighboring Hale's. The soil
removal would require heavy-duty trucks to make over six-hundred trips
across a road on Hale's property. The Railroad Commission stated that it
was authorized by statute1 25 to enter Hale's property for the purpose of
conducting the cleanup operation on the neighboring ranch. Hale filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment, temporary restraining order, and in-
junctive relief contending that the Railroad Commission was improperly
applying the statute, or in the alternative, that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it violated the Due Process Clauses of the Texas and
United States Constitutions.126 The trial court issued a temporary
injunction.' 27
The Railroad Commission appealed the denial of their plea to the juris-
diction.128 The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a suit to test the
validity of an oil and gas conservation law or order must be filed in Travis
County.1 29 The court concluded that the statute1 30 was jurisdictional, and
not a venue statute, so, jurisdiction in Travis County was exclusive. 3 1
Since Hale's action was filed in Roberts County, the court rendered judg-
ment dissolving the temporary injunction and granting the agency's plea
to the jurisdiction-effectively ending the landowner's case. 132
G. STANDING TO CHALLENGE LANDFILL PERMITS
The issue of who has standing to challenge a landfill permit modifica-
tion arose in Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. v. Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality.133 Texas Disposal Systems (TDS) operated a
landfill near Austin, and it challenged the administrative procedures
granting permit modification to a landfill near Weatherford, over 200
miles away. The lower court held that, since the landfills were not com-
petitors, Texas Disposal Systems (TDS) had no standing to challenge the
124. No. 07-07-0343-CV, 2008 WL 191017, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 23, 2008)
(mer. op.), reh'g overruled by State v. Hale, Tex. App. LEXIS 1922 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
Mar. 11, 2008).
125. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.113(c) (Vernon 2001).
126. Hale, 2008 WL 191017, at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *2.
130. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.241 (Vernon 2001).
131. Hale, 2008 WL 191017, at *2.
132. Id.
133. 259 S.W.3d 361, 362 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, no pet.).
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permit or its issuance.134 TDS appealed, claiming that it may no longer
be able to compete with other landfills if they receive permit modifica-
tions via the procedure used by the Weatherford landfill. 135 The appel-
late court stated that to have standing, "the complainant must show that a
concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury faces him due to the
decision; a hypothetical or speculative injury is not enough. ' 136 The court
held that TDS's injury was "mere speculation," falling short of establish-
ing a justiciable interest and standing, and affirmed the trial court's
dismissal. 137
H. REUSE AND RECYCLING AND THE DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE
The question of when a material that might otherwise be classified as a
waste ceases to be a waste because it is going to be recycled is a constant
question for environmental lawyers. In a case brought before the Austin
Court of Appeals, the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) argued that
the material was still a waste because of how it was stored prior to re-
cycling, while the hauler of the material argued it was not a waste at all,
regardless of how it was stored. 138
The materials in question were drill cuttings and other oil and gas
wastes from exploration and production activities. The matter arose
when the RRC inspected a facility on a ranch owned by the same party
that owned the waste hauling company. The president of the waste
hauler first contacted the RRC to ask if the company needed a permit.
The RRC staff initially responded that no permit was required, because
the facility had been registered with the TCEQ as a waste recycling facil-
ity.1 39 Subsequently, after further consideration, the RRC staff decided
that Rule 8 required the company to obtain a permit to "store and pro-
cess waste and re-use processed material. ' 140 The waste company re-
quested a letter of authority or permit, but it was denied by the RRC.
The company appealed the decision to the Travis County District
Court.141 While the suit was pending, an agreement was reached, but the
waste hauler failed to meet the agreement; the RRC initiated enforce-
ment proceedings, and the waste hauler filed suit.1 42 The court entered
an agreed order to allow continued operations if financial security was
filed with the RRC, which was filed in the form of a $500,000 bond to
meet financial security requirements under Rule 78.143 However, the




137. Id. at 364.
138. Osage Envtl., Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., No. 03-08-00005-CV, 2008 WL
2852295, at *6 n.4 (Tex. App.-Austin July 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. (citing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (2008)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at *2.
143. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78 (2008).
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required in the agreed order, and instead allowed it to grow to 62,000
cubic yards.
An enforcement action was then conducted by the RRC, which issued
a $40,000 fine for failure to comply with the permit and RRC rules.1 44
Thereafter, the waste hauler initiated a third lawsuit in which the district
court affirmed the RRC's order.145
On appeal the issue was whether a waste recycler must comply with
Rule 8.146 The waste hauler argued that the material, which was largely
drill cuttings, was being recycled by mixing it with caliche, lime, and, at
times, other materials to make a road base. He argued that the material
was not an "oil and gas waste," but an ingredient for making road base
material.
The RRC argued that the material remained a waste until it was re-
cycled into a road base, and before that it was regulated as a waste. The
court recognized the cases under federal solid waste laws that have been
addressed by federal courts in which materials stored on the ground
before recycling were still considered wastes.147 The court noted that the
drill cuttings were first delivered to the ranch and deposited on the
ground, where the material could be subject to surface water run-off.
The court concluded that the materials were a waste and were regu-
lated by the enabling statute and the RRC regulations, namely Rule 8.148
The court found that a permit was required and upheld the RRC's en-
forcement order against the waste hauler.149
I. DEFINING THE MEANING OF "THE PUBLIC INTEREST"
FOR PERMITTING PROCEDURES
In another case involving the RRC's waste permitting power, a citizens
group filed suit against the RRC challenging the issuance of a permit to a
party to operate a commercial injection well for the disposal of oil and
gas waste.150 The citizens group challenged the Railroad Commission's
granting of the permit on two grounds: first, that allowing the applicant to
reschedule the hearing to revise the application so it was administratively
complete denied the protesters due process, and, second, that the Rail-
road Commission read the requirement that the well must be in the pub-
lic interest too narrowly.
On the first issue, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the Rail-
road Commission had not denied the protesters due process under the
144. Osage EnvtL, 2008 WL 2852295, at *2.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id. at *6 n.4 (citing Owen Elec. Steel Co. v. Browner, 387 F.3d 146, 149-50 (4th Cir.
1994); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
148. Id. at *6.
149. Id.
150. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water v. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 254 S.W.3d
492, 494 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
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Texas and U.S. Constitutions.1 51 The court concluded that the recess and
rescheduling of the hearing did not deny the protesters the right to par-
ticipate in the administrative process. 1
52
The second challenge was the finding of the Railroad Commission that
permitting a wastewater well would be "in the public interest." The Texas
Water Code requires that the Railroad Commission find, before issuing a
permit, the "use or installation of the injection well is in the public inter-
est. '153 The Railroad Commission had read this requirement to only re-
quire that the well be approved if there is a possibility of increased oil
and gas production.1 54 The Austin Court of Appeals ruled that this is too
narrow a reading of the meaning of "in the public interest. '155
One of the issues raised by the citizens group was the flow of truck
traffic on roads in the area if the permit was granted. For injection wells
reviewed by the TCEQ, the Texas Water Code requires consideration of
the impact on public roadways by the agency when reviewing injection
well permit applications. 156 While the provision governing the Railroad
Commission consideration of injection well permit applications does not
require such consideration, the court held that it was within the purview
of the agency to consider the effect on public safety. 157 The court re-
manded the case back to the Railroad Commission to consider public-
safety concerns where evidence of such concerns had been presented in
the permit proceeding. 158
VII. CLEAN AIR ACT
A. CITIZENS SUIT CHALLENGE OF EPA APPROVAL OF
STATE'S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
The Clean Air Act was a source of litigation during the Survey period.
In one case, a citizens group challenged the EPA's final rulemaking ac-
tion approving the Mid-Course Review State Implementation Plan
(MCR SIP) submitted by the State of Texas for the Houston/Galveston/
Brazoria Severe Ozone Nonattainment Area (HGB Area). 159 The citi-
zens group know by the acronym GHASP put forth three arguments:
(1) EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the MCR SIP
because it [did] not demonstrate attainment of specified emissions
reductions; (2) EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on
weight of evidence analysis to excuse modeled nonattainment; and
(3) ... EPA violated the non-interference or anti-backsliding provi-
151. Id. at 498.
152. Id.
153. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.051(b)(1) (Vernon 2008).
154. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future, 254 S.W.3d at 499.
155. Id. at 502.
156. Id. at 500.
157. Id. at 501-02.
158. Id. at 503.
159. Galveston-Houston Ass'n for Smog Prevention (GHASP) v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 289 F. App'x 745, 746 (5th Cir. 2008).
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sion of the Clean Air Act. 160
GHASP's first argument focused on the EPA's action to approve
TCEQ's exclusion of three days of exceedances from the nineteen-day
sampling period for the photochemical modeling underlying the MCR
SIP. 161 The modeling, along with other evidence, predicted that the
MCR SIP would allow the HGB Area to meet attainment. 162 GHASP
argued that by excluding three days of exceedances from the data set, the
modeling was flawed.163 TCEQ had excluded those three days, along
with six other days which were not exceedances, due to "model perform-
ance issues."'1 64 The court noted that the EPA had provided a rational
explanation for its determination that the ten remaining sample days pro-
vided a sufficient basis for the modeling, and upheld the EPA's action. 165
GHASP's second argument challenged TCEQ's use of evidence other
than modeling to show that the HGB Area would meet attainment.
GHASP acknowledged that the Clean Air Act provided that the attain-
ment demonstration could be made through photochemical modeling "or
any other analytical method determined ... to be at least as effective."'1 66
GHASP argued that the way the EPA applied the weight of evidence
analysis was arbitrary and capricious. 167 Specifically, GHASP challenged
the EPA's action to allow TCEQ to exclude one day of exceedance be-
cause of unusual weather conditions. The EPA had excluded the sam-
pling day because the temperature and wind patterns were unusual. The
court concluded that given the explanation and the "substantial defer-
ence" given to the agency, the EPA was not unreasonable when it al-
lowed TCEQ to exclude the sampling day.' 68
GHASP's third argument, that the MCR SIP violated non-interference
and anti-backsliding provisions of section 110(1) of the Clean Air Act,
was based on the fact that the MCR SIP, when compared to the 2001 SIP,
relaxed controls on industrial nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions and
dropped a requirement for vehicle inspection and maintenance in three
counties, restrictions on commercial lawn maintenance operations, speed
limit reductions, and restrictions on idling heavy diesel engines. 69
GHASP argued that to comply with section 110(1), EPA had to show that
the results under the MCR SIP are better than the 2001 SIP. The court
disagreed and held that the EPA may approve a SIP revision "unless the
agency finds it will make air quality worse.' 70 The court went on to find
that, because the EPA considered that the offset of NOx controls was
160. Id. at 746-47.
161. Id. at 750.




166. Id. at 752 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(A)).
167. Id.
168. ld. at 753.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Ky. Res. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 467 F.3d 986, 995 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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offset by the addition of new controls for volative organic compounds
(VOCs), the agency's decision to approve the MCR SIP did not make air
quality worse and was not arbitrary and capricious. 171
B. CITIZENS SUIT CHALLENGING A COMPANY'S PERMIT APPLICATION
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act provides a process for a
citizen or citizens group to challenge either a private party or an agency's
actions.172 In one case during the Survey period, citizens groups at-
tempted to challenge a company's application for a permit for a coal-fired
power plant.1 73 The citizens groups filed a lawsuit prior to the permit
being issued during the application process. The question in the case was
whether the federal Clean Air Act provided jurisdiction for such suits.1 74
The federal district court dismissed the suit.175 The Fifth Circuit reviewed
this dismissal on appeal.1 76
Section 7604(a)(1)-(3) of the Clean Air Act provides three situations in
which a citizen may file suit.177 Two of those situations were at issue in
the case. The first instance is where a party has violated or is in violation
of "an emission standard or limitation" or "an order issued by the [EPA]
or a [state agency] with respect to such a standard or limitation. '178 The
second instance is where a "person who propose[d] to construct or con-
structs any new or modified major emitting facility without a permit" or
"is alleged ... to be in violation of any condition" of a permit that has
been issued.1 79
The analysis of whether TXU was in violation of an emission standard
or limitation centered on the definitions of "emission standard or limita-
tion."180 The first aspect of the relevant definition is a requirement of
condition of a permit.18' The citizens groups argued that the preconstruc-
tion requirements could be deemed to have been violated if the applica-
tion filed does not meet the Clean Air Act requirements for a permit.
The court concluded that until a permit is issued, there is no permit to
violate and no standard or limitation to violate.18 2
The second part of the definition of standard or limitation related to
the provision that included "any other standard, limitation, or schedule
established ... under any applicable State implementation plan."'1 83 The
citizens groups argued that the state implementation plan contained
171. Id. at 754.
172. CleanCOALition v. TXU Power, 536 F.3d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 2008).
173. Id. at 470.
174. Id. at 473.
175. Id. at 471.
176. Id. at 473.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. CleanCOALition, 563 F.3d at 475-76; see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f)(1)-(4).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f)(3).
182. CleanCOALition, 536 F.3d at 475.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f)(4).
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preconstruction requirements and that TXU could be deemed to have
violated these by filing a permit application that did not meet the precon-
struction requirements. 184 TXU argued that those provisions only in-
volve emission standards and limitations. The court concluded that filing
an incomplete application was not relevant since the permit proceeding
was ongoing and subject to state review.185 The preconditions relate to
granting a permit, not applying for one.186
The court then turned to the issue of whether section 7604(a)(3) al-
lowed a preconstruction citizens suit where a facility had obtained a per-
mit or was in the process of applying for a permit. 187 The court concluded
that this provision allowed a suit where the party was operating without a
permit. Based on the review of the citizens suits arguments and its rejec-
tion of them, the court upheld the district court's dismissal of the citizens
suit, partially on the basis that there was no subject matter jurisdiction for
the suit.188
C. CITIZEN SUITS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
Citizen suits are legal actions permitted under environmental statutes
whereby citizens may act as private attorney generals and sue parties or
agencies for failing to follow a particular statutory provision, regulations
promulgated under a particular environmental statute, or environmental
permits. In Blue Skies Alliance v. Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality,189 the court struggled with the ability of the citizen plaintiffs to
recover attorney's fees under the federal Clean Air Act. Environmental
organizations brought an action against the EPA for failing to take non-
discretionary actions under the Clean Air Act. Several counties and pro-
fessional organizations intervened, as did the TCEQ.
Negotiations resulted in a consent decree with the EPA and an agree-
ment by TCEQ to undertake several measures. After the court approved
the agreements, the environmental organizations filed a motion seeking
attorneys' fees from TCEQ under section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act,
and the court granted it.190 TCEQ appealed. The appellate court cited
Supreme Court precedent in holding that, even though the Clean Air Act
does not explicitly limit attorney's fees to successful parties, "a clear
showing from Congress is required to conclude that it intended to depart
from 'intuitive notions of fairness."191 The court stated that "some de-
gree of success on the merits" by the claimant was necessary to justify an
award. 192 The court held that since the groups had sued to compel the
184. CleanCOALition, 536. F.3d. at 476.
185. Id. at 478.
186. Id. at 477-78.
187. Id. at 478-79.
188. Id. at 478.
189. 265 F. App'x 203 (5th Cir. 2008) (not designated for publication).
190. Id. at 206.
191. Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983)).
192. Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694).
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EPA administrator to perform his duties and had "articulated no cause of
action against the TCEQ, they could not achieve any success on the mer-
its ... to justify an award of attorneys' fees" from TCEQ.193 The court
reversed the award of attorneys' fees. 194
The case of United States v. Alcoa, Inc.195 involved two suits, one a
citizen suit brought by the Neighbors for Neighbors, Inc., Environmental
Defense, and Public Citizen, Inc., and one brought by the United States
against Alcoa, Inc. The district court decision was reviewed in last year's
Environmental Survey. During this Survey period, the Fifth Circuit re-
viewed and upheld the lower court's ruling. The case consisted originally
of claims that Alcoa failed to obtain appropriate permits for alleged
modifications made to three lignite-fired boilers that provided electricity
to an Alcoa aluminum plant in Rockdale, Texas. In addition, the plain-
tiffs alleged that Alcoa exceeded its permit limits for NOx, sulfur dioxide
(S02), and particulate matter (PM). The parties entered into a settle-
ment and the district court entered a consent decree on July 28, 2003 (the
consent decree).1 96 The consent decree allowed Alcoa three options to
continue to supply electricity to its aluminum plant. Alcoa chose to re-
place the existing lignite-powered units and to construct new ones that
apply the pollution controls consistent with new permitting require-
ments. 197 The provision required that construction of new units begin
within nineteen months of receiving a TCEQ permit amendment and
within twenty three months that construction of all new units begin. The
old units were shut down as the new units became operational, the first of
which was to begin operation by April 25, 2007. Alcoa petitioned the
district court to modify or continue the deadline, but they were denied. 198
The United States and Alcoa, with its new partner, a TXU subsidiary,
negotiated a stipulated order to address the violations of the deadlines in
the consent decree. As is required, the settlement was published in the
federal register and public comment was received. In response to that
public comment, an amended stipulated order was submitted to the dis-
trict court. The order provided for approximately $1.8 million in penal-
ties, extended the date for commencing the operation of the new plant by
two and one-half years, required the old plant to shut down sooner, and
set stricter standards for the new plant. 199 The district court also held
Alcoa in contempt and changed attorneys' fees and other sanctions. 200
The citizens groups objected to the stipulated order. The main reason
for the objection was that the consent decree did not require Alcoa to
seek a new permit that would require tougher restrictions on the emis-
193. Id. at 207.
194. Id.
195. 533 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2008).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 281-82.
198. Id. at 282.




sions of the new power plants, which they contended was an appropriate
sanction for failing to timely initiate construction. 20 '
One of the objections was that the court was modifying the consent
decree when, by its terms, it required agreement of all parties. The Fifth
Circuit ruled that the district court acted within its power to provide a
remedy for the violation of the consent decree rather than modifying
it. 2
0 2
VIII. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Texas courts addressed several National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) cases. The overriding themes of all of the NEPA decisions were
that NEPA only guarantees a process and not a result, and that courts are
extremely deferential to government agencies.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF A PROJECT MAKES NEPA CHALLENGE MOOT
In the first case, homeowners who were dissatisfied with the noise gen-
erated by a proposed new highway ramp brought actions against the fed-
eral government under the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative
Procedure Act for violations of NEPA and the Federal Aid Highways Act
(FAHA).20 3 The trial court dismissed the homeowners' claims, and they
appealed. By the time of the appeal, the highway ramp had been com-
pleted, so the appellate court addressed the issue of mootness. 20 4 The
Fifth Circuit cited precedent holding that completion of construction
moots a NEPA action.20 5 "These cases recognize that 'the basic thrust of
NEPA is to provide assistance for evaluating proposals or prospective
federal action in light of their future effect upon environment factors, not
to serve as a basis for after-the-fact critical evaluation subsequent to sub-
stantial completion of construction.' 20 6 The court stated that "NEPA
guarantees a process, not a particular result," and that "NEPA's pre-con-
struction process offers little to a plaintiff after completion of construc-
tion. '20 7 The court stated that although the NEPA claim was moot, the
FAHA claim was not because FAHA can require more than just pro-
cess. 20 8 The court ultimately held that, while the FAHA claim was not
moot, the appealing homeowners had not presented meritorious grounds
for appeal, and it affirmed the trial court's judgment.20 9
201. Id. at 283, 285.
202. Id. at 286.
203. Ware v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin., 255 F. App'x 838, 838-39 (5th Cir. 2008) (not
designated for publication) (per curiam).





209. Id. at 840.
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B. ADEQUACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND DECISION NOT
TO PROPOSE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
In the second NEPA case, City of Dallas, Texas v. Hall, the City of
Dallas and the Texas Water Development Board challenged the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service's (FWS) decision to establish the Neches River Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge under NEPA by claiming that an adequate Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) or Environmental Assessment (EA)
was not prepared. 210 The FWS established an acquisition boundary for
the refuge after performing an EA and issuing a Finding of No Significant
Impact (FONSI). The plaintiff city and state agency had planned to po-
tentially build a reservoir on the site to meet Dallas's future water needs
in 2060. In the first set of issues, the City claimed that the FWS was
wrong in failing to prepare an EIS.21 1
The court analyzed the factually-similar Sabine River Authority v. U.S.
Department of Interior212 case and concluded that NEPA does not require
a federal agency to prepare an EIS to maintain the status quo.2 1 3 As for
the indirect effects on Dallas, the court held that any impacts on the
City's future water supply would not be proximately caused by the FWS
and that the impacts would be too remote and speculative to deter-
mine.2 14 The City argued that agency guidelines required the preparation
of an EIS, but the court found that the federal action here did not affect
the human environment and that the agencies acted within their
discretion.21 5
In the second set of issues, the plaintiffs argued that the EA was inade-
quately prepared.2 16 The court held that, as to all of the City's com-
plaints, the highly deferential standard of review led to a determination
that the FWS had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 21 7 For example,
even though the FWS had used a twenty-year-old analysis of the habitat,
the City had not sufficiently shown that a more current study would have
revealed the existence of a significant impact or a different set of alterna-
tives.218 Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that FWS acted arbitrarily and ca-
priciously by not appropriately consulting with state and local agencies. 2 19
The court cited the fact that the plaintiffs waited until the end of the EA
process to ask for more time to conduct their own research. 220 The court
held that "NEPA does not require an agency to delay ... indefinitely"
while agencies or other outside parties spend an unreasonable amount of
210. Nos. 3:07-CV-0060-P, 3:07-CV-0213-P, 2008 WL 2622809, at *1 (N. D. Tex. June
30, 2008) (mem.).
211. Id. at *4.
212. 951 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1992).
213. Hall, 2008 WL 2622809, at *5.
214. Id. at *7.
215. Id. at *8.
216. Id. at *9.
217. Id. at *9-13.
218. Id. at *12.
219. Id. at *13.
220. Id. at *14.
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time developing alternatives.22' The court held that although the regula-
tions do not address the timing of inter-agency consultation in the prepa-
ration of an EA, the process should parallel the EIS regulations. 222
Finally, the court found that the record showed that the FWS had consid-
ered and responded to the plaintiffs' concerns before preparing the
EA.223 Based on this analysis, the court denied the plaintiffs' summary
judgment motions.2 24
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR NEPA SUIT
The third case involved a nonprofit organization that brought a suit
under NEPA, complaining about the approval process for a highway.225
The defendants claimed that the suit was filed after the statute of limita-
tions had expired. The two issues in this case were: (1) which statute of
limitations applied, and (2) whether a later reevaluation of a project can
revive the statute of limitations on an earlier finding of no significant im-
pact (FONSI) decision.2 26
The limitations period that applied when the FONSI was issued was six
years. Shortly thereafter, and two years before the suit was filed, the lim-
itations period was changed to 180 days. The court held that the period
of limitations in place at the time the plaintiff filed his complaint gov-
erned.227 The court held that the change was not genuinely retroactive
because it governed the secondary conduct of filing suit rather than the
primary conduct of the defendants and that it did not alter either party's
liability or impose new duties.228 Since the plaintiff had constructive no-
tice of the statute and a reasonable time to pursue his claim in court,
there was no inequity in applying the shorter limitations period. 22 9
The plaintiffs then argued that the agencies' second look at the envi-
ronmental concerns re-opened those issues to litigation, while the defend-
ants argued that the reevaluation was more similar to an internal
memorandum. Here, the reevaluation tailored the project to include sev-
eral new rights of way and drainage and trail easements that required the
use of an additional 5.7 acres. The court considered whether this was a
fundamental change, which would constitute a final agency action, or a
minor alteration.230 The court found that the reevaluation made minor
changes to design elements already contained in the FONSI, so reliance
on it as the basis for filing suit was inappropriate. 231 The court found that
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *15.
224. Id.
225. Highland Vill. Parents Group v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin., 562 F. Supp. 2d 857,
860 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (mem.).
226. Id. at 862.
227. Id. at 863.
228. Id.
229. Id.




the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations and dis-
missed the suit.2 32
IX. ENDANGERED SPECIES
A. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND POTENTIAL
UNDISCOVERED CRITICAL HABITAT
In a case involving the role of the federal Endangered Species Act in
decisions of the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC), a group of
landowners appealed a PUC order allowing the construction of a power
transmission line across their property.233 They contended that the PUC's
findings regarding endangered species habitat were not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. The Austin Court of Appeals stated the standard of
review for agency findings: the court presumes that the order is supported
by substantial evidence and the challengers have the burden to demon-
strate otherwise. 234
"Substantial evidence requires 'only more than a mere scintilla,' and
the evidence on the record may preponderate against the decision of the
agency and nonetheless amount to substantial evidence. '235 Experts on
both sides acknowledged that a previously unknown, occupied habitat
might exist along the route. However, the court held that since there was
no evidence of occupied habitat, the PUC's finding of fact was supported
by the record.236 Furthermore, the court held that "environmental integ-
rity [was] only one factor that the PUC may consider. ' 237 The court re-
fused to substitute its judgment for how the PUC weighed the several
statutory factors, stating that none were intended to be absolute. 238
B. COMPLETION OF PROJECT MAKES CHALLENGE MOOT
In another case involving the Endangered Species Act, Aquifer Guardi-
ans in Urban Areas v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, environ-
mental organizations brought suits against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) under the Endan-
gered Species Act alleging that an approved power transmission line
would jeopardize the habitat of an endangered bird.239 By the time the
case reached trial, the power transmission line at issue had already been
built. The trial court found that the organizations' claims were moot.
240
The court held that since the project was complete, the Corps no longer
232. Id. at 866.
233. Dunn v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 246 S.W.3d 788, 789-91 (Tex. App.-Austin
2008, no pet.).
234. Id. at 791.
235. Id. (quoting R.R. Comm'n v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex.
1995)).
236. Id. at 793.
237. Id. at 794.
238. Id.
239. 555 F. Supp. 2d 740, 741 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
240. Id. at 745.
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had jurisdiction over the private company's activities, and no federal ac-
tion remained for the FWS to review. 24 1
Although the plaintiffs argued that "the Corps always has general juris-
diction over the waters ... of the United States," the court held "that the
Corps [did] not have jurisdiction over private parties whose permitted
projects have been completed. '242 The plaintiffs contended that the case
should not be held moot, because, under the capable-of-repetition doc-
trine, future scenarios could similarly avoid review. The court held that
"although there may be a limited span of time between issuance of the
permit and completion of the construction, there are methods available to
halt the construction and receive full review. '243
Here, although the plaintiffs filed suit before the line was complete,
they did not move for a restraining order or an injunction. The court
acknowledged that what the plaintiffs really wanted was a change in pol-
icy, so that future considerations would not suffer from the same de-
fects. 244 However, the court stated that "speculative future actions" are




The challenge of agency action at times goes beyond whether an
agency is properly acting under the statute passed by the legislative
branch and extends to whether the legislature had the power to delegate
certain powers to that agency in the first instance. This concept is known
as the nondelegation doctrine-that is, what limits apply to a legislature's
ability to delegate certain powers to an administrative agency. In one
case during the Survey period, a Texas appellate court analyzed the
nondelegation doctrine with respect to the TCEQ's authority to deter-
mine which materials may be placed on an outdoor burn ban list.246 The
party that challenged the TCEQ's power had started a fire that consumed
crossties, fiberglass, tires, and PVC pipe.2 47 He was criminally prosecuted
under section 7.177(a)(5) of the Texas Water Code for violating the
TCEQ regulations concerning outdoor burning.248 The TCEQ's outdoor
burning rules were promulgated under the authority of Texas Health &
Safety Code section 382.018(a), and prohibit the burning of "'[e]lectrical
insulation, treated lumber, plastics, non-wood construction/demolition
241. Id. at 744.
242. Id. at 743-44.
243. Id. at 745 (quoting Bayou Liberty Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 217 F.3d
393, 398 (5th Cir. 2000)).
244. Id. at 744.
245. Id.
246. State v. Rhine, 255 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. granted)
(mem. op.).




materials, heavy oils, asphaltic materials, potentially explosive materials,
chemical wastes, and items containing natural or synthetic rubber." 249
The defendant filed a motion to quash the charging information, argu-
ing that "the legislature had unconstitutionally delegated authority" to
the TCEQ to determine precisely which materials should be placed on
the burn ban list.250 The trial court granted the defendant's motion, con-
cluding that the "nondelegation doctrine" of article II, section 1 of the
Texas constitution prohibited the legislature from delegating such author-
ity to the TCEQ.251
The nondelegation doctrine provides that the legislature cannot dele-
gate to some other commission or tribunal the power to pass laws.2 5 2 The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, citing extensively to Texas Boll Weevil
Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellen,253 noted that the nondelegation
doctrine has been applied sparingly, and that "in our complex society, it is
not possible for the Legislature to shoulder the burden of drafting the
infinite minutiae required to implement every single law necessary to ad-
equately govern the State of Texas."2 54 The court went on to find that the
provisions of the Health and Safety Code delegating power to TCEQ
contained "definite guidelines" and included "sufficient standards" to
guide the discretion conferred.255 The court of appeals reversed the trial
court and held that the legislature's delegation of authority to TCEQ to
promulgate a burn ban list was constitutional. 256
249. Id. (quoting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 111.219(7) (2007)).
250. Id. at 747-48.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 748.
253. 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997).
254. Rhine, 255 S.W.3d at 748-49 (citing Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d at 454).
255. Id. at 751-53.
256. Id. at 753.
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